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Abstract—BGP is the default inter-domain routing protocol
in today’s Internet, but has serious security vulnerabilities [1].
One of them is (sub)prefix hijacking. IETF standardizes RPKI
to validate the AS origin but RPKI has a lot of problems [2]
[3] [4] [5], among which is potential false alarm. Although some
previous work [4] [2] points it out explicitly or implicitly, further
measurement and analysis remain to be done. Our work measures
and analyzes the invalid prefixes systematically. We first classify
the invalid prefixes into six different types and then analyze their
stability. We show that a large proportion of the invalid prefixes
very likely result from traffic engineering, IP address transfer
and failing to aggregate rather than real hijackings.
Index Terms—BGP, RPKI, ROV
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet is an inter-connected network without a center. It
is made up of more than 50000 autonomous systems(AS for
short). To transmit packets across the ASes, Border Gateway
Protocol(BGP for short) is designed and implemented [6]. In
BGP, every autonomous system will announce the prefixes
owned by itself and propagate routing information it learned
from its neighbors according to a policy. When propagating
the prefix, the ASes will maintain a path to the origin of the
prefix and can choose among different paths.
However, as a fundamental part of Internet infrastructure,
BGP has serious security vulnerabilities [1]. One of them
is BGP prefix hijacking. In prefix hijacking, an AS may
illegitimately announce a prefix not owned by itself and then
those ASes who accept the announcement will transmit the
packets to a wrong destination. Prefix hijacking may result
from misconfiguration and malicious attack. Using prefix
hijacking, the attackers can block web service, steal secret
information and do man in the middle attack, etc [1]. Actually,
BGP prefix hijacking is frequently appearing in recent news
[7] [8]. In one of the most famous prefix hijacking events,
Pakistan Telecom blocked Youtube for more than 2 hours
[9], causing inconvenience to the Youtube visitors all over the
world. To tackle the problem of prefix hijacking, IETF(Internet
Engineering Task Force) standardizes a framework called
RPKI(Resource Public Key Infrastructure) to validate the
origination AS of a prefix [10]. In RPKI, trust anchors(the
five regional Internet registries) sign prefixes and allocate the
signed prefixes to NIRs, LIRs or ISPs. And then prefixes will
be assigned hierarchically to customers. Prefix owners can sign
an object called Route Origin Authorization to authorize an
AS to announce a prefix. A ROA consists of a prefix, prefix
length, maximum length, the AS authorized to announce the
prefix [10] and the trust anchor. ROAs are stored in distributed
repositories and can be fetched to validate the BGP items. We
now illustrate how ROAs can be used to validate the BGP
items. For simplicity, we define BGP item as a two-element
tuple (prefix, AS path), where AS path means a sequence of
ASes that the announcement of the prefix traversed. And the
last AS in the AS path is the origination AS of the prefix.
Given a set of ROAs, there are three possible validation results
of a BGP item as shown below.
Unknown The prefix in BGP item is not covered(Prefix A
covering B means B is not longer then A and the first
length of prefix A bits of the two prefixes coincide.)
by any prefix in ROA.
Valid There exists a ROA item such that the prefix
in BGP item is covered by the prefix in ROA, the
length of the prefix in BGP item is no longer then
the maximum length and the origination AS of the
BGP item is the same as the authorized AS in ROA.
Invalid The prefix in the BGP item is covered by one
prefix in ROA, but is not valid.
With ROAs validating all the BGP items, the prefix hijack-
ing problem seems to be solved perfectly. However, up to now,
RPKI has not been fully deployed and partial deployment may
result in unexpected trouble like false alarm. False alarm prefix
can reduce the trustability of RPKI and even make those ASes
that discard false invalid prefixes lose Internet connection to
the discarded prefixes. So a systematic analysis and evaluation
of current invalid BGP prefixes are in urgent needs and of
great significance. Our work, to the best of our knowledge,
systematically classifies and evaluates the invalid BGP prefixes
for the first time. We find that most of the invalid prefixes result
from traffic engineering purposes like multi-homing and load-
balancing. We also find a large part of the invalid prefixes are
very likely transfer prefixes. And finally we build a website
to publish our analysis and classification result to help the
network operators design better routing policy.978-3-903176-15-7 © 2019 IFIP
II. RELATED WORK
Currently there are mainly two lines of efforts to tackle
the threat of prefix hijacking. The first is detection approach.
For example, Zheng Zhang, et al., designed a system called
iSPY to detect IP prefix hijacking on its own [11]. Xiaoliang
Zhao, et al., analyzed BGP multiple origin conflicts and gave
the potential reasons [12]. Xingang Shi, et al., utilized the
correlation of control plane information and data plane infor-
mation to detect the hijacking prefix [13]. However, detection
approach may suffer from false alarm.
The second is validation approach. To tackle the threat of
prefix hijacking thoroughly, IETF(Internet Engineering Task
Force) standardizes a framework called RPKI [10]. ASes can
use signed ROAs to validate the origin of prefixes. However,
RPKI is not perfect and faces some unexpected problems in the
deployment process. Danny Cooper, et al., flipped the threat
model and analyzed the risk of misbehaving RPKI authorities
[3]. Ethan Heilman, et al., design tools to detect potential
harm to BGP prefix and propose some modification of RPKI
to improve its transparency [2]. Yossi Gilad, et al., show
that MaxLength can be harmful to RPKI [5]. Yossi Gilad,
et al., point out that partial deployment of RPKI can result
in false invalid BGP prefix [4]. However, to the best of our
knowledge, there is no systematic measurement and analysis
of invalid prefix. To fill the gap, we collect BGP prefixes for 3
months and analyze them by classifying them according to the
AS path structure, aggregation structure and AS commercial
relationship.
III. CLASSIFICATIONS OF INVALID PREFIXES
Now we describe our classifications of invalid prefixes
based on AS-path structure, prefix aggregation structure and
AS-relationship structure. The following six types of invalid
prefixes are in fact false alarms, which mean invalid BGP items
providing legitimate connections. Note that in all the invalid
prefix illustration figures the AS following the prefix is the
BGP origin AS and TAxx represents a trust anchor.
A. Invalid load-balancing prefix
In this scenario, an AS may first got a ROA with a relatively
short maximum length. However, the AS may then announce
to be the origin of a more specific prefix for load balancing
reasons. For illustration, as shown in figure 1, AS1 may be
assigned a prefix 123.121.0.0/23 and to secure the prefix,
relevant authority may sign a ROA with maximum length 23
for the (AS1, 123.121.0.0/23) pair. However, after some time,
AS1 may announce two more specific prefixes 123.121.0.0/24
and 123.121.1.0/24 through its two providers AS2 and AS3
respectively for load balancing reason. Then, AS4 using RPKI
for BGP prefix validation will determine those two more
specific prefixes are invalid.
B. Invalid failing to aggregate prefix
This type of invalid prefixes differ from invalid load-
balancing prefixes in that invalid failing to aggregate prefixes
are announced according to exactly the same export policy.
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Fig. 1. An illustration of invalid load-balancing prefix
For illustration, as shown in figure 2, AS1 may be first
assigned a prefix 123.121.0.0/23 and a corresponding ROA
with maximum length 23. Then, for some reason such as
ignorance or customer requirement, AS1 may then announced
a more specific prefix 123.121.0.0/24. However, because 24 is
larger than the maximum length 23 in ROA, 123.121.0.0/24
is considered invalid by AS4, which uses RPKI for prefix
validation.
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Fig. 2. An illustration of invalid failing to aggregate prefix
C. Invalid multihoming prefix
In this scenario, a customer doing multihoming may an-
nounce invalid prefix. For illustration, as shown in figure 3, the
provider AS2 may assign a subprefix 123.11.0.0/24 of its own
prefix 123.11.0.0/23 to AS1 and at the same time, AS2 got a
ROA item: AS2, 123.11.0.0/23,24, TAxx. However, AS1 may
have other provider AS3 besides AS2 and propagate prefix
thorough AS3. Then AS4 will treat 123.11.0.0/24 as invalid
prefix.
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Fig. 3. An illustration of invalid multihoming prefix
D. Invalid singlehoming prefix
In this scenario, a customer doing singlehoming may also
announce invalid prefix. For illustration, as shown in figure
濅濃濄濋濂濊濂濄濉 濅濃
濔濦濄
濔濦濅
濄濅濆濁濄濄濁濃濁濃濂濅濇澿濔濦濄
濔濦濆
濥濢濔瀆澳濗濴瀇濴濵濴瀆濸 濥濢濔濍澳濔濦濅澿澳濄濅濆濁濄濄濁濃濁濃濂濅濆澿濅濇澿澳濧濔瀋瀋
濄濅濆濁濄濄濁濃濁濃濂濅濇
濄濅濆濁濄濄濁濃濁濃濂濅濆澿濔濦濅澳
濄濅濆濁濄濄濁濃濁濃濂濅濇澿濔濦濄
濥濢濔 濗濴瀇濴澳濶瀂濿濿濸濶瀇濼瀂瀁
濕濚濣 濥瀂瀈瀇濼瀁濺澳濜瀁濹瀂瀅瀀濴瀇濼瀂瀁澳
濣瀅瀂瀃濴濺濴瀇濼瀂瀁
濣瀅瀂瀉濼濷濸瀅激濖瀈瀆瀇瀂瀀濸瀅澳
濥濸濿濴瀇濼瀂瀁瀆濻濼瀃
濦瀈濵瀃瀅濸濹濼瀋 濴瀆瀆濼濺瀁瀀濸瀁瀇
澽濢濪濕濠濝濘澔濧濝濢濛濠濙濜濣濡濝濢濛 濤濦濙濚濝濬
Fig. 4. An illustration of invalid singlehoming prefix
4, AS2 has a prefix 123.11.0.0/23 and to protect its pre-
fix from being hijacked, AS2 also gets a ROA item: AS2,
123.11.0.0/23, 24, TAxx. However, AS2 further assigns a
subprefix of 123.11.0.0/23 to its customer AS1. And AS1
announces the subprefix through its provider AS2. For some
reasons like ignorance or to attract more traffic, AS2 does not
aggregate the subprefix announced by the customer AS1. Then
AS3 considers 123.11.0.0/24 as invalid.
E. Invalid provider prefix
A dual case of invalid singlehoming prefix is invalid
provider prefix. Actually, some of the providers do not include
its customer’s AS number into the AS path when propagating
the prefix announced by its customer. For illustration, as shown
in 5, the provider AS2 assigns a prefix 123.11.0.0/24 to its
customer AS1. To secure the prefix 123.11.0.0, a ROA (AS1,
123.111.0.0/24, 24, TAxx) is signed and published in the ROA
database. However, when propagating the routing information,
AS2 announces 123.111.0.0/24 as the origin AS though it
should have included AS1 as the origin AS. As a result,
123.11.0.0/24 will be considered as an invalid prefix.
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Fig. 5. An illustration of invalid provider prefix
F. Invalid transfer prefix
Last but not least, due to active IP address transaction
and the mobility of the organizations owning IP prefixes, IP
address transfer is becoming more and more frequent and
can result in invalid prefix. For illustration, as shown in
figure 6, AS2 used to own the prefix 131.51.0.0/24 and the
corresponding ROA. For some reason, the prefix transferred
to AS5 but the ROA: (AS2, 131.51.0.0/23, 24, TAxx) isn’t
revoked or modified. So when the routing information of
131.51.0.0/24 is propagated to AS3 from AS5, the prefix is
considered invalid due to the obsolete ROA item.
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Fig. 6. An illustration of invalid transfer prefix
Validation Result Number of Routing Items Ratio
Unknown 635412 90.87%
Valid 58931 8.43%
Invalid 4949 0.71%
TABLE I
RPKI BASED ROUTE ORIGIN VALIDATION RESULT(DATA COLLECTED ON
16TH, MAY, 2018)
IV. DATASET AND ROUTE ORIGIN VALIDATION RESULT
The six types of invalid prefixes described in section III are
all actually legitimate. That is to say, they are false invalid
prefixes. To evaluate different types of invalid prefixes, we first
collect BGP routing data for almost 3 months from February,
2018 and then do route origin validation. To collect BGP
routing data, we set up a private AS. Then with our private
AS, we do BGP peering with AS4538(China Education and
Research Network), which is adjacent to several core ASes and
can collect most of the BGP data on today’s Internet. Through
AS4538, we collect BGP routing table, taking a snapshot of it
every day, and BGP update data of the whole Internet. As
for the ROA data, we use the software rpki-validator [14]
provided by RIPE-NCC to collect and validate the ROA data.
We also take everyday snapshot of the ROA data. After data
collection, we build a prefix aggregation forest according to the
aggregation relationship. We call the prefixes not covered by
other prefixes maximal prefixes. Then with BGP routing table
and ROA data, we do route origin validation. The validation
result is shown in table I.
V. ARE INVALID PREFIXES REALLY INVALID?
Theoretical analysis in section III shows that there are six
possible scenarios where traffic engineering, prefix deaggrega-
tion and address transfer can result in false invalid prefixes.
And notably, there are 4949 invalid prefixes in the validation
result. Although address hijacking is frequent these days, very
unlikely we can detect thousands of hijackings at the same
time. So the validation result is highly suspicious.
A. The classification result of real world BGP data
According to the classifications listed in section III, we
design classification rules as shown in table II to classify the
BGP prefixes.
We first sort the BGP prefixes, search the maximal prefix
and build the prefix aggregation forest. For every node in the
Type of invalid
prefix
Is the AS in ROA
the same as BGP
origin AS
Is the AS in ROA
provider of BGP
origin AS
Is BGP origin AS
the provider of the
AS in ROA
Multiple providers
Is there parent
prefix or sibling
prefix with different
AS path
Is there parent
prefix or sibling
prefix with the same
AS path
Invalid
load-balancing
prefix
Yes No No — Yes —
Invalid failing to
aggregate prefix
Yes No No — No Yes
Invalid multihoming
prefix
No Yes No Yes Yes —
Invalid
singlehoming prefix
No Yes No No Yes —
Invalid provider
prefix
No No Yes — — —
Invalid transfer
prefix
No No No — — —
TABLE II
THE CLASSIFICATION RULES OF INVALID PREFIXES
prefix aggregation forest, we associate it with an AS path
attribute for search in classification process. Then we apply
the rules in table II to efficiently classify the prefixes. To
find transfer prefix, we also use zmap [15] to scan the ip
addresses under a prefix seeming to be transferred and we
classify it as transfer prefix if we get active response. We
show the classification result in table III. We observe that more
than 60% of the invalid prefixes very likely result from traffic
engineering, IP address transfer and failing to aggregate rather
than real hijacking. And the rest of the invalid prefixes can be
other types of false invalid prefixes or real hijacking.
B. The stability of invalid prefixes
We also monitor the invalid prefixes from 28th, February,
2018 to 16th, May, 2018 and we find that as shown in table
III, most of the invalid (prefix, origin AS)s in different types
are actually long-lived(meaning the (prefix, origin AS) pair
keeps existing during our data collection period), implying
they are more likely just false alarms since the real hijackings
tend to be short-lived. On the one hand, the potential false
alarms diminish the reliability of RPKI, thus slowing down the
deployment of RPKI. On the other hand, false alarm may affect
the false invalid prefixes’ reachability for RPKI adopters. So
we build a website to publish the possible false alarm prefixes
and help network operators make better routing policy to avoid
losing reachability due to false alarm. The website can be
accessed through 202.38.101.13:5000.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We first describe our classifications of invalid prefixes based
on the AS path structure, prefix aggregation structure, AS
commercial relationship. Then we collect real world BGP
data for about 3 months and design rules to classify them.
We find that more than 60% of the prefixes belong to the
six types we describe in section III, implying that they very
likely result from traffic engineering, IP address transfer and
failing to aggregate rather than real hijackings. We also find
Type of
Invalid
prefix
Number
Percentage
in invalid
prefix
Number of
long-lived
(invalid
prefix,
origin AS)
pairs
Percentage
of prefixes
with
long-lived
(prefix,
origin AS)
pair in this
type
Invalid load-
balancing
prefix
923 18.7% 770 83.4%
Invalid
failing to
aggregate
prefix
703 14.2% 684 97.3%
Invalid mul-
tihoming
prefix
378 7.6% 355 93.9%
Invalid sin-
glehoming
prefix
204 4.1% 177 86.8%
Invalid
provider
prefix
186 3.8% 147 79.0%
Invalid
transfer
prefix
737 14.9% 658 89.3%
Other
invalid
prefix
1818 36.7% 1695 93.2%
TABLE III
THE CLASSIFICATION RESULT AND STABILITY OF INVALID PREFIX(DATA
COLLECTED ON MAY, 16TH, 2018)
that most of the invalid prefixes are long-lived, which justifies
the implication. One possible direction of future work is to do
survey over practitioners to verify whether the invalid prefixes
are false alarms and find even more types of false alarms.
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